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Abstract

A sense of morality, or values predisposing what is right (fair, just, kind) and what is
wrong (unfair, cruel, dishonest), appears universally across all humankind. All major cultures
share support for some values, such as self-respect, respect for others, and 'the golden rule'
treat others how you wish to be treated-and disdain for some sins, such as murder, theft and
dishonesty (Kinnier, Kernes & Dautheribes, 2000). Some moral behaviors, such as inequity
aversion, the tendency to do no hann and cooperation are found to exist in virtually all human
adults. But where does morality come from? Is it uniquely human or do we share some moral
values with nonhuman animals? To explore these questions domestic dogs-nonhumans with
exceptional social cognitive skills-were tested for moral values through a replication of a study
on moral reasoning in human infants (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). Dogs watched a puppet show
with a moral and immoral actor-the moral actor helped a neutral character achieve a goal and
the immoral actor prevented the actor from achieving the goal. Dogs generally looked longer
when the neutral puppet chose to associate with the moral helper than the immoral hinderer,
demonstrating that dogs, like human infants, may prefer when agents associate with moral
helpers. Though this is a preliminary study it suggests that a sense of morality may not be
uniquely human and may be an evolved trait shared by humans and nonhumans alike.
Origins of Morality

Morality is defined as a set of values differentiating right (fair, just, kind) from wrong
(unfair, cruel, dishonest) in the subject's mind. With such a SUbjective definition, studies and
writings on morality differ vastly. Regardless, scientists and philosophers generally agree that
some sense of morality, of right and wrong, appears universally across all humankind. All major
cultures uphold some common values, such as self-respect, respect for others, and 'the golden
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IUle'-treat others how you wish to be h·eated-and disdain for some sins, such as murder, theft
and dishonesty (Kinnier, Kernes & Dautheribes, 2000). Some moral behaviors, such as inequity
aversion, the tendency to do no hann, and cooperation are found to exist in virtually all human
adults.
Inequity aversion is defined as a preference for fairness and a disfavor towards inequality.
A classic example of inequity aversion in human adults can be seen in the ultimatum game in
which player 1 has a sum of money or rewards that they divide between themselves and player 2.
Player 2 can either accept the proposal, and both players will get the proposed sum, or reject the
proposal, and neither player will get anything. Players are much more likely to divide the
rewards in an equal or close to equal way (50/50, 60/40) than they are to divide it in a way that
they or the other player would benefit significantly more than the other (i.e., 80/20; Giith,
Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982). Perhaps most impressively, players engaged in a dictator
game - shucturally equivalent to the ultimatum game but without the option for player 2 to
decline the offer - also share rewards fairly equitably, even though player 2 cannot retaliate and
reject the offers (Forsythe et aI, 1994). Further, participants often opt to punish 'free-riders',
people who reap benefits but do no work, in voluntary cooperation games (Fehr & Schmidt,
1999). The choice of punishing those who gained benefits with no effort demonsh·ates that
human adults generally feel as though things should be fair and equal-those that work the
hardest get the most benefits, and those that do not work get no benefit. Inequity aversion can be
seen cross-culturally as well-Ugandan children preferred to distribute stickers equally to
children who completed a task successfully, and were even more likely to throw away stickers
rather than distribute them unequally (Paulus, 2015). The fact that no reward was more
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preferable than an unequal reward shows strong evidence for inequity aversion, even in nonWesternized societies.
Another universal trait among humans is the tendency to do no harm. Most human
adults-save for some criminals-prefer not to harm others. They demonstrate the tendency to
do no harm through a classic experiment-the trolley problem (Foot, 1967). Subjects were told
to make a decision on a hypothetical situation : If a trolley with 5 passengers was about to crash
and the only way to stop it was to saClifice one other person, what would you do? The vast
majority of participants choose to save five people over one, showing that, generally, people
want to cause the least amount of hmm when possible. To further support this, people in the
study were more likely to pull a lever to save 5 and harm 1 than to actually push a person onto
the tracks to stop the h·ain. This is because the tendency to do no harm is so great that that close
connection between one's action and another's hann makes it that much more aversive.
Therefore, pulling the lever to cause hmm rather than directly pushing a person was much more
favorable. Once again, this moral trait was seen cross-culturally. When the trolley problem was
presented to people fi'om the Malagasy tribe of Madagascar, they had different questions than
Amelican pmticipants (who are the people involved, what is my relation to them) but regardless,
answered in a very similar way to the American pmticipants-choosing to sacrifice one person to
save multiple people was the more favorable response, as it did the least amount of hann (Bloch,
2012).
Finally, cooperation is a common moral trait mnong humans. Human adults demonstrate
cooperation through numerous examples in day-to-day life such as not cheating during card
games, paying back someone who is owed money, or sitting quietly in a movie theater so as not
to disturb other moviegoers. A classic example of human cooperation is seen through the
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prisoner's dilemma. The prisoner's dilemma is an interaction where two players can earn
different payoffs based on cooperating or defecting (Fig. I). Individuals receive the greatest
reward by defecting, yet overall both benefit most by cooperating (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).
Broken down, the reward for unilateral defection is greater than the reward for mutual
cooperation, which is greater than the reward for mutual defection, which is in turn greater than
the reward for unilateral cooperation (see Fig. 1). Pmiicipants are generally willing to cooperate,
and more likely to cooperate when the game is being played in person than over a computer
(Furlong & Opfer, 2009), demonstrating that personal interaction enhances likelihood to
cooperate. A cross-cultural study on the prisoner's dilemma found that Chinese paliicipants were
likely to cooperate, but more likely to cooperate when they were primed with awareness of their
Chinese culture--exposure to Chinese cultural images such as a Chinese dragon and a person
performing kung fu (Wong & Hong, 2005). Generally the participants were likely to cooperate,
but the fact that culture priming increased cooperation suggests that cooperation is a deeply
impOliant pmi of one's home culture.
Subject's Choice
Defect (D)
Cooperate (C)
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Figure I: Matrix values in a typical prisoner's dilemma game. The most beneficial rewards for both parties come fi'OI1l mutual
cooperation (R), although the most beneficial alvord for olle party comes from defecting as the other party cooperates (T)
(Furlong & Opfer, 2009).

These examples of universal behavior in human adults provide evidence that morality and
moral behavior are traits that are common to viliually all human adults, much like traits such as
capability of language or a preference for sweet and fatty foods, But where does morality come
from? One common misconception is that morals come from religion; however, morality is not
specific to religion, as secular organizations such as the United Nations and the American
Humanist Association agree upon similar moral codes to each other and to religious
organizations (Kinnier, Kernes & Dauthelibes, 2000), If morals don't come from religion, do
they come from others via other fonns of social transmission? Or are they innate, built into our
brains through evolution?
This question about the origins of morality -whether it arises from nature or nurture - has
been debated as far back as the 15th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) takes a strong stance
for the nativist camp, arguing that: "everything is good as it comes fi'om the hands of the Author
of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man" (pp, 1). The Rousseauvian view
therefore, suggests that humans enter the world naturally good and then become con-upted by
modem society. A strong stance for the empilicist camp, however, comes from Thomas Hobbes
(1651) who argued that humans start life naturally 'brutish' but become saved from their natural
state by society. The Hobbesian view, therefore, posited, that evil is innate, while morality comes
fi'om environment and culture. Though arguments on the origin of morality began centuries ago,
cun-ent research has not progressed much further. In fact, evidence supports both sides of the
argument-some work suggests that that morality is innate while other work suggests that
morality is learned,
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Current Research on Morality

Learned morality theory.

One argument for effe cts of nurture comes from admittedly

rare, vast cultural differences in moral nonns. Cannibalism, for example, is hOiTendous and
criminal to most, if not all, indush'ialized cultures but perfectly nonnal to headhunting cultures
(Prinz, 2011). Less striking but nonetheless revealing evidence comes from cultural differences
in victimless crimes -- Brazilian citizens take a more moralizing stance than Americans to an
offensive yet victimless action such as defacing a national flag (Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993). In
addition, morality takes an individualistic stance with Americans whereas it takes a collectivistic
stance among Hindu Indians (Miller, 1994). That is to say, Americans care more about personal
morals and personal moral decisions whereas Hindu Indians care more about group morals and
moral decisions that affected a group rather than an individual. In the study, Hindu Indian and
American adults were presented with scenarios where, for a selfish reason, an agent failed to
help another with a life-threatening issue, a moderately serious issue, or a minor issue. Hindu
Indians were much more likely to say that not helping the other person was unacceptable, even if
the issue was minor, whereas Americans were likely to view not helping as acceptable in all
situations except the life-threatening one. With such differences existing between cultures,
learned morality proponents believe that morals depend on an individual's upbringing, and
therefore are not universal.
In addition to cultural differences, advocates of the nUlture approach point to the lack of
a biological basis for morality as support that morality is learned (Baron-Cohen, 2013). For a
particular trait to be considered

an

evolutionarily endowed (innate) trait including variability

between individuals, heritability from parent to offspring, differential reproduction, and selection
(sexual, natural, or artificial). In the case of morality it's not clear that these criteria have been
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met. While there is some variability in moral intuitions and moral reasoning, if a trait is truly
innate it should be heritable. However, researchers have yet to identify a genetic basis for moral
reasoning (Hunter, 2010). For example, morally-objectionable behaviors cannot be linked to
genetics in the absence of confounding environmental factors (Pollack, 2006). Since no 'morality
genes' have been discovered some are convinced that morality cannot be innate. Morality also
has selection pressure, as people with morals are more likely to reproduce and be mentally
sound, and cause differences in reproduction, as it is more common for someone to have morals
rather than not (Sperber & Baumard, 2012). However, the big problem is heritability. Since there
is seemingly no genetic basis for morality, it cannot be inherited and, by criteria, cannot be a trait
of natural selection, and therefore not innate (Ridley, n.d.).
Innate morality theory.

Despite evidence that morals vary some across cultures and the

lack of heritability of moral values, the evidence that morality is innate outweighs the evidence
for the learned morality theory. Cultural differences may occur in morality, but people of all
cultures still have some kind of morals. Cultures may differ in what exactly they think is right
and what is wrong, but they still all have a sense that some behaviors are right while others are
wrong. It does not matter if the specific content of these moral behaviors differ; the impOliance
of moral values cross-cu lturally provides evidence that the capacity for morality itself is innate.
Further, recent evidence hints that we may soon find some genetic basis of morality: subjects
with a shorter serotonin transporter genotype allele were more likely to rate actions that caused
intentional hann to another as acceptable while those with a longer allele were more likely to rate
these actions as unacceptable (Marsh et aI, 2011). Therefore, this suggests that the genetic
argument for learned morality may no longer be plausible as further genetic research progresses.
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The innate morality theory states that morality is not a product of our environment, but
innately hardwired in our brains. Proponents of this theory generally provide suppOli for this
theory b y exploring moral reasoning in subjects with little ability to learn morality from
humans-preverbal infants and non-human animals. The logic of studying these two populations
rests on the assumption that if moral behavior is found in subjects with little to no human
influence on their behavior, then it is highly unlikely that their morals were learned from
experience, from culture, or from some other fonn of social learning. Human infants have had
limited experiences, thus any sense of morality seen in infants is unlikely to have arisen from
learning. Similarly, animals, even those that live with humans, are not acculturated the same way
humans are, and thus ifthey demonstrate a sense of morality it will provide converging evidence
that morality is innate.
Illllate morality ill preverbal ill/allts. Preverbal infants have not yet had much

0ppOliunity to be shaped by society, which makes them a viable candidate for the innate morality
theory. The field of infant morality is fairly new, yet several studies have already found moral
behaviors in infants with relatively little experience. For example, 5 and 9-month-old infants
who observed a puppet show with a moral (a puppet who helps another puppet achieve a goal of
opening a box to retrieve a toy) and an immoral (a puppet who prevents another puppet from
opening the box) opted to interact with the moral actor significantly more than the immoral actor
(Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). Interestingly this preference did not appear to arise simply from a
preference for a puppet that helps to meet goals generally, as this preference existed only when
the actors were animate, apparently social, beings. When the 'actor' became an inanimate green
pincer infants no longer preferred the actor treating the pincer 'morally' over the actor treating
the pincer 'immorally'. This work suggests that infants did not choose based on reinforcement
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history, or which puppet offered rewards (by opening the box for the actor), but that rather their
choice was based on the social interactions they witnessed.
Additional evidence that infants have access to some moral intuitions comes from even
younger infants. When 3-5 month old infants watched a puppet show where animate shapes
either help another shape reach its goal (climbing a hill) or hindering the shape from doing so,
they prefelTed the helper shapes significantly more than the hinderers (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom,
2007). In general it appears that infants judge others based on the morality of their actions by
prefening those who help helpers and those who hann hinderers (Hamlin, 2013).
Choosing a puppet or shape that does 'right' over one that does 'wrong' strongly suggests
the infants used moral evaluation. These studies provide compelling evidence that preverbal
infants make morally based decisions before language, before they have experienced these
conditions themselves, before they could have been reinforced or punished for acting morally or
immorally. In short, before cultural norms are likely to have shaped their moral intuitions.
In addition to demonstrating some sense of 'right ' and 'wrong ', infants share the
aforementioned moral traits of inequity aversion, the tendency to do no harm, and cooperation
with human adults. Since humans that are shaped by society (adults) and humans that are not
(infants) both share these traits, it is likely that moral behavior is innate.
Inequity aversion can be observed in infants as young as IS-months old (Schmidt &
Sommerville, 2011). Infants were shown a movie where a character distributed four crackers
amongst two people. The exact distribution of crackers was blocked by a censor bar until it was
removed to reveal one of two scenarios: the crackers were evenly distributed (two for each
person), or the crackers were unequally distributed (one person had one cracker whereas the
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other had three). Infants looked longer at unfair distribution as opposed to fair, a common
measure that infants ' expectations about the distribution of crackers had been violated. In other
words, infants expected an equal distribution and appeared 'surprised' by the unequal
distribution. The infants had naturally assumed the distribution would be fair, so the unfair
distribution was unexpected (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011).
Although the tendency to do no hann may not be fully developed at such a young age,
toddlers are still able to exhibit the tendency and the tendency to provide reparative behaviors
when accidentally causing harn1. Toddlers were very responsive to their mother's distress and
even slightly responsive to a stranger's distress (Zalm-Waxler et ai, 1992). Mothers simulated
emotions or issues such as sadness, unresponsiveness and respiratory distress in front of their
toddlers. The toddlers' responses were recorded by the mother initially. After one month,
mothers returned to the lab and an experimenter recorded the toddler's response. One month
after this, the child and mother went back into the lab and a female experimenter displayed the
distressful actions. The study found that generally, the toddlers responded with physical or verbal
prosocial behavior or empathic concern. The study also found that most toddlers exhibited
reparative behavior when they themselves caused the stress as opposed to being a bystander
witnessing the situation, and their reparative behaviors in general increased with age.
Finally, just like adults, infants generally cooperate with others. 14-month-old infants
were presented with an apparatus that required one to push the bottom of a cylinder up and
another to reach an opening on the apparatus to retrieve a reward. It was impossible for the
infants to achieve this on their own, and both steps were necessary to gain the reward. After a
single demonstration, most children were able to figure out how the apparatus worked and
collaborated with an experimenter to achieve the goal (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). Since the
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infants completing this task were only 14 months old, it provides evidence that the tendency to
cooperate with others is a task that isn't learned from experience, but one that is likely im1ate.
Innate morality in nOll-human animals. Infants are capable of moral behaviors despite

comparatively little adult human interaction, thus, it should come as no surprise that non-human
animals are capable of moral behaviors as well. Since most non-human animals have little to no
social contact with humans the existence of moral behavior in this population supports innate
morality theory. For example, when rats were faced with two locked chambers, one containing
food and the other containing a trapped fellow rat, the rats often freed the fellow rat before
unlocking the food chamber (Balial, Decety & Mason, 2011). The rats were not encouraged to,
or rewarded for freeing the fellow rat-in fact, fi-eeing the rat meant there was immediate
competition for the food -yet rats freed their peer anyway. This study strongly casts doubt on the
suggestion that morality arises fi'om learning, as rats did this in the absence of training and at a
cost to themselves. Their choice to fi'ee the other rat first suggests they preferred to help another
rather than help themselves-a moral behavior.
Additional evidence that animals have a sense of right and wrong comes fi'om rhesus
monkeys who refuse food when it caused another monkey to receive a shock, African elephants
who chase off attackers of a wounded elephant, and Capuchin monkeys who give large rewards
to fellow Capuchins even if it means that they get a small reward (Lakshminarayanan & Santos,
2008; Poole, 1998; Wechlin et aI., 1964). These examples of prosocial behavior without
reinforcement in non-human animals add compelling evidence to the study of morality. If these
animals engage in behaviors solely to help others, it is highly likely that they have developed a
system of rights and wrongs. More compelling evidence comes from the fact that non-human
animals share the same moral traits as human infants and human adults-inequity aversion, the
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tendency to do no hann, and cooperation. The existence of these traits in all three groups
strongly suggest morality is not something that is fully shaped by the environment.
Perhaps the best evidence for inequity aversion comes from brown capuchin monkeys
who responded negatively when given a lesser treat than another monkey for doing the same task
(Brosnan & DeWaal, 2003). Monkeys were trained to hand an experimenter a token for a reward.
When one monkey handed the experimenter a token it received a cucumber, a decent reward for
monkeys. When an adjacent monkey handed the experimenter an identical token, it received a
grape, which is a very favorable reward for monkeys. After witnessing this, the initial monkey
handed the experimenter another identical token, presumably expecting to receive a grape.
Instead, the monkey again received a cucumber. Monkeys who receive an inequitable
distribution reacted aggressively when they were given a less-than-favorable reward than another
for perforn1ing the same action. In a similar vein, domestic dogs stopped perforn1ing a command
for a reward when another dog was given a better reward for the same command (Range et ai,
2009). These displays after an unequal dishibution of goods demonstrate that the monkeys and
domestic dogs were aware of the inequity and possessed inequity aversion, much like human
adults or infants faced with inequalities.
Just as animals show human-like tendencies for inequity aversion the tendency to do no
hann can also be seen. Rats were trained to press a lever for food and once they learned this
researchers introduced a new manipulation-after they pressed the lever, a rat in an adjoining
cage was shocked (Church 1959). The lever-pressing rat witnessed the shock but still received
food. After witnessing another rat hanned from their lever pressing a number of times rat
refrained from pressing the lever, even if it meant they would not receive food. The decision to
stop receiving a reward when it came at the cost of a fellow rat demonstrates that, generally, rats
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seek to not do hann to others. Importantly this exists even at the expense of reinforcement
history - the rats were reinforced for pressing the lever with food, not for h elping the other rat.
Thus, this provides additional evidence against leaming theory and suggests that even rats have
moral intuitions against hanning others.
Finally, animals demonstrate cooperation in a variety of situations. The classic task of
cooperation involves working together to achieve an out of reach food source. Elephants were
presented with an apparatus where they had to pull a rope to receive food (Plotnik et aI, 2010).
However, the ropes were looped around the food such that if one elephant pulled the rope would
unravel from the apparatus and not bring the food to the elephant. The ropes would only retrieve
the food when two elephants each picked up different sites of the rope and simultaneously
pulled. When the elephants discovered this, they exhibited cooperative behavior by waiting for
another elephant to come up to the apparatus before pulling the rope. The elephants even began
to wait for their partner to pull the rope by waiting at the gate of their partner's enclosure before
approaching the mechanism. In a similar experiment, chimpanzees w ere given an apparatus and
tools to work the apparatus in order to receive a reward. The chimps needed to move a thin stick
and a thick stick in order to tilt a platfonn and move grapes to a reachable location. The two
tasks could not be performed at the same time by the same chimpanzee. The chimps exchanged
tools and were able to use the cOITect tools the cOITect ways the majority of the time due to their
good use of cooperation.
The fact that human infants and nonhuman animals demonstrate the same kinds of moral
behaviors as human adults without same cultural trappings provides strong evidence for the
innateness theory of moral reasoning. However, this viewpoint can only be suppOlied if
continued evidence of multiple species demonstrating moral behavior arises. Therefore, species
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that may have the capability for moral behavior should be studied to see ifthey too can support
the theory of animal morality. One species that has not been extensively tested for moral
behavior is the domestic dog (Canis lupusfamiliaris). Dogs co-evolved with humans over
thousands of years, and since they are so closely related with human interaction, it is possible
that they have adapted human intuitions into their behavior. A non-human species with close
connections to humans is worth researching for evidence of moral intuition, as they offer up the
animal and human sides of interaction and social behavior.
Moral Behavior in Domestic Dogs

Dogs are incredibly social creatures and show strong inter-species social cognition with
humans. They exhibit many human-like behaviors and cognitions such as infelTing intentions
and solving means-end tasks (Hare & Tomasello, 2005, Range, Hentrup & Viranyi, 2011;
Stauch, AuBuchon & Furlong, in prep). Additionally, dogs perfonn exceptionally at cooperation
and communication tasks with humans and are able to perceive a human's actions as goal
oriented (Wobber & Hare, 2009, Marshall-Pescini, Ceretta & Prato-Previde, 2014). Dogs can
even communicate well enough with humans to recognize human emotions of disgust and joy
(Turcsan et aI., 2014). Thus, dogs are very socially adept creatures. Domestic dogs even perfonn
better than chimpanzees, our closest extant relatives, in a task involving use of social cues such
as reaching, pointing and gazing. Further, domestic dogs also perfonned better than human
reared wolves at this task, even if the dogs were only a few weeks old (Hare et aI., 2002).
Since morality is a social trait that is universal in humans, and dogs share many human
social traits, it is extremely likely that dogs have evolved moral cognition due to centuries of
human interaction. This is not to say that moral behavior was taught to the dogs by human
observation, but that domestic dogs evolved moral behaviors over time, perhaps due to humans
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artificially selecting dogs exhibiting such traits. Much like any species uses adaptation to
survive, dogs with a sense of morals may have been more likely to survive and reproduce than
those that did not have a sense of morality.
We hypothesize that domestic dogs have a sense of morality, which can be demonstrated
through their choices of social partners. To test if dogs made morally-based decisions, dogs were
shown a puppet show similar to Hamlin and Wynn's (2011) puppet show. In this study dogs
were shown a moral actor (who helped a neutral actor complete a goal) and immoral actor (who
hindered the neutral actor from completing the goal), and their preference for the actors was
recorded. We predict that the dogs, like human infants, will prefer a moral actor more, and thus
will prefer to watch the neutral puppet interact with the moral actor to the neutral puppet
interacting with the immoral actor.
Methods

Subjects

Volunteers were solicited in two ways : by flyers or conversation at Paradise Pets daycare
in Bloomington, IL and by recruitment emails sent to Illinois Wesleyan University faculty and
staff. Interested owners completed an online questionnaire about their dog including the dog's
age, breed, health history, training history and temperament. Once this was received owners were
emailed with additional infonnation about the studies that take place in the lab. Dogs who were
tested at Paradise Pets daycare were sent an infonned consent form to sign and return while those
who were tested on campus were sent scheduling infonnation and were asked to sign the consent
fonn upon their first visit to the lab. Only dogs whose owners both completed the online
registration and signed the consent fonn were allowed to pmiicipate in the study. Subjects were
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27 domestic dogs of multiple breeds, both male (n
from 5 months to 11 years (M= 4.98, SD

=

=

19) and female (n = 8). They ranged in age

2.71).

Materials

The stage for the puppet show was created out of PVC pipe and black fabric acting as a
curtain and backdrop. The pipe stage's dimensions measured 49" x 26" x 27", with the curtains
measuring in at 49" x 26". Behind the cUliain but in fi'ont of the backdrop was a cardboard box
covered in chrome tape and measuring 9" x 18" x 9 Y, "which acted as a stage. Three puppets (7
y,

" x 4 Y, ") were used in the show-a tiger, giraffe and cow puppet. The tiger was dark orange

with black tiger stripes, the giraffe was yellow with brown giraffe spots and homs, and the cow
was white with black spots and homs. All puppets had black eyes, a nose and a stitched-on
mouth in the shape of a smile. Also used in the show were a translucent pencil box (2 Y, " x 8 Y,
" x 5 Y, ) and a small (3" x l") rawhide bone. The puppets w ere operated b y hand until the test
"

trial, where the moral and immoral puppets were placed on plastic water bottles (5 Y,

"

x 2 Y, x)

that were taped to the stage to k eep them standing up while the experimenter operated the neutral
puppet.

18

Running head: DOMESTIC DOGS' EVALUATION OF MORALS

Figure 2: The puppet stage alld actors at the end of the mora/familiarization /rial.

Preference Tests

A preference test was conducted to select puppets before the study began. Three puppets
who were generally equally liked by the dogs (based on looking time) were used as the moral
actor, immoral actor, and actor puppet interchangeably. The dogs' preferences were decided
based on their time looking and interacting with each individual puppet when presented with
multiple. Three puppets that the dogs interacted with/looked with about

an

equal amount of time

(tiger, giraffe and cow) were chosen. The toy in the actor puppet's box, a rawhide bone, was also
subject to a preference test so that the toy chosen was one that the dogs found mildly
interesting-not exciting enough to be distracting, but exciting enough to ath·act their attention.
Procedures

Dogs were tested at an on-site laboratory at Illinois Wesleyan University or at a testing
room at Paradise Pets dog daycare. Dogs entered the testing area and were given time to
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acclimate to the setting and greet the researchers before the study began. The study began with
the dog being held by a handler (EI) blind to the conditions who looked away fi'om the stage
during testing and/or closed hislher eyes during the study. A second experimenter (E2) showed
the dog a small rawhide bone and then put the bone in a box sitting on top of the chrome stage. A
third experimenter (E3) was concealed behind the curtain and conducted the puppet show.
During the puppet show dogs witnessed a neutral puppet (NP) trying, with difficulty, to
open a box to retrieve the bone inside. A rawhide bone was chosen as the box contents to pique
the dog's interest, as it was not too interesting or too uninteresting to the dogs. Moral agent
puppet (MP) then came onstage and helped NP open the box by pulling at the opposite end. After
the box opened, MP left the stage and NP grabbed the rawhide bone inside. This scene was held
static for a 10 second looking period during which E2 filmed the dog's looking behaviors
Next, the dogs witnessed the same scene-NP attempting to open the box-but an
immoral puppet (IP) came onstage and jumped on the box, shutting it. After the box was shut,
NP lay face-down on the ground to demonstrate frustration or distress and IP left the stage.
Another 10-second looking period then elapsed.
All dogs received both of these events in counterbalanced order and with puppets
randomly assigned to the three different roles. Until this point ali dogs received the same
treatment. The final test condition occurred when all three actors came onto the stage, with NP in
the middle between IP and MP. NP looked at both puppets, and then moved to stand next to
either the MP or IP to demonstrate its 'choice' of social partner. This choice was decided when
an RA, blind to the conditions and the stage, calied out either "1" or " 2", dictating which
condition the puppeteer would have for the test, 1 being the first familiarization and 2 being the
second. NP remained with its choice of social partner for another 10 second looking period.
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If the dog looked longer when NP chose the MP, it was infelTed that the dog prefen-ed the
MP to IP, as dogs tend to look at things they find interesting or attractive. The following were
counterbalanced across subjects in each condition : experimental condition (social or inanimate),
identities of actors (giraffe, tiger or cow puppet), order of shows (moral or immoral going first or
second), and placement of actors (left or right) during choice.
Coding and Reliability

Primary video coding was done by the author, and two research assistants coded the same
videos to measure inter-rater reliability. One coder was briefly and vaguely trained by the author,
as they had no previous experience in coding a looking time study. The other coder had some
experience but received the same tutorial. They were taught how to decipher if a dog was
looking at the stage or not, and trained with a video not used in the study. All three coders coded
the videos separately. Inter-rater reliability was .81 with the new coder and .95 with the
experienced coder.
Differences from Original Study

The domestic dog replication study was much like the original with a few changes. In the
original study with infants, the infant's preference was decided by recording which puppet they
initially reached for in a testing peliod after familiarization with the actors-the moral or the
immoral one (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). In this replication, the dog's choice is decided by
recording their looking time solely, not reaching, at test period after two familiarizations-one
with the moral actor and one with the immoral actor. In addition, if the infant was not paying
attention to the puppet show, they were excluded from the study. If a dog was not paying
attention to the show, a squeaky toy was squeaked or their name was called so they could direct
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their attention back to the stage. However, if the dog continued to not pay attention, they were
also excluded from the study. Finally, the present study did not have an inanimate condition,
only a social one, in the interest oftime.
Results

A3

X

2 repeated measures ANOVA with trial type (moral familiarization, immoral

familiarization, test trial) as the within subjects variable and condition (moral vs immoral
outcome) as the between subjects variable revealed no interaction between trial type and
condition (F[2, 24]=. 84 7b ,p=.441), and no main effect of trial type (F[2,24]=2.12b,p=.142).
However, there was a main effect of condition such that dogs in the moral condition (M=5.54,
SD=.64) looked longer than dogs in the immoral (M=3.58, SD=.72) condition (F[ I,25]=4.12,
p=.053).
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Figure 3: Results of 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, measuring mean looking time at the immoral and moral condiUolls (moral
fam. and moral test, immoral fam. and immoral test), with the latter being Significantly higher (F[J,25]=4.12, p=.053).

To explore whether this effect was due to the crucial test condition and not the less
important familiarizations (which should have been the same across trials as they occurred
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before the crucial test condition) we subtracted the average amount of time dogs looked in the
familiarization tJials from the amount of time dogs looked at the test. Typically, looking time
decreases over time, thus we would expect this to be a negative number. However, we expect
condition differences in the magnitude ofthis value such that dogs in the immoral condition will
decrease their looking more than dogs in the moral condition. In other words, dogs in the moral
condition should have a difference score closer to 0 than dogs in the immoral condition.
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A one-way ANOVA comparing this difference score in the two conditions revealed no
significant difference in condition (F[ I,25]= I. 74, p=.199). Contrary to our predictions subjects
in the moral condition generally looked less at the test than the familiarization (M=-1.715,
SD=2.9), whereas in the immoral condition, subjects looked only slightly less at the test than the
familimization (M=-.34, SD=2.37). Although this difference was not statistically significant, this
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pattern is interesting since it is essentially opposite the overall means for the test trials in which
overall dogs looked longer in the moral case (M=4.98) than the immoral case (M =3.43). This
result appears to have arisen from dogs looking longer on average in the familiarization trials for
the moral actor (M=5.539, SD=.64) compared to the immoral actor (M=3.58, SD=.72). Given
that the dogs looked longer at the moral than the immoral actor in the familiarization tasks,
however, the difference in the immoral condition should be greater than the difference in the
moral condition, which is the opposite of the actual effect.
Discussion

To further explore the foundations of moral behavior, domestic dogs were tested for
moral intuitions. Domestic dogs have superior social cognition to nonhuman primates and other
species and a long history of co-evolution with humans. Thus dogs would be expected to be a
good candidate species to find human-like moral intuitions in a nonhuman animal. We hoped to
find that domestic dogs would look longer when a moral actor was chosen as a social partner b y
a neutral a ctor than if an immoral actor was chosen b y a neutral actor. This result would be
consistent with the literature of moral reasoning in human infants and would demonstrate that the
dogs were able to make judgments about the moral and immoral actors based on limited
infornlation gleaned from familiarization trials. FUliher, it would demonstrate that and that dogs
preferred the moral actors being chosen by the neutral actor, as that would be a logical and
accepted choice.
What our results portrayed, however, was that dogs looked longer at the familiarization
trials as opposed to test trials when the choice outcome was to an immoral actor. This result is
surprising given that dogs are not assigned to conditions - moral or immoral - until after these
familiarization trials have been completed. Further, assignment is blind- one researcher calls out
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a number (l or 2) which the puppeteer then uses to assign the condition. Importantly, the person
who calls the condition does not know which outcome I and 2 are, and the person who is putting
on the puppet show cannot cue the dog one way or the other as she is con cealed behind a screen.
Thus, we must conclude that due to random factors we found dogs who were, on average, more
likely to look longer in the moral condition than the immoral condition.
These unexpected results produce more questions for further study than answers.
Generally, it is difficult to make a definite conclusion on whether dogs preferred the moral or
immoral actor, as the results were contradictory. The difference in looking time at the
familiarizations support the theory that dogs prefer the moral actor (M=5.42, SD=3.43) to the
immoral one (M=4.64, SD=3. I)but the lack of difference in test trial looking time and the change
in familiarization to test looking time do not support the theory.
However, the results suppOJi that the dogs may differentiate between the moral and
immoral actor. Therefore, the dogs are able to distinguish the two, but do so in a different way
than the infants in the Hamlin and Wynn (2011) study. The infants reached for and looked at the
puppet in the testing period that they preferred, but the dogs did not show a significant
preference in the testing period, or even a significant preference in familiarization trials.
However, since the combined looking time for moral familiarization and test was significantly
higher than the combined looking time for the immoral familiarization and test, there is another
way of differentiating at play for the dogs. Since the dogs' looking time in the familiarization
and the testing period for the immoral condition were very similar, whereas looking time
dropped for the moral condition, it may suggest that a violation of expectation paradigm may be
at play. This means that the dogs would look longer at something that they find unexpected and
surprising. The dogs may be looking about the same amount of time for the testing period due to
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the neutral puppet's choice of the immoral actor being illogical to them. Regardless, it can be
concluded that the dogs differentiate between the two, but their processes for doing so are
unknown.
The results garnered from the study could be interpreted as some mild support for the
innate morality theory or the learned morality theory due to their contradictory nature. It could
just be that the dogs in the experiment generally were longer lookers, and the differences
between the two groups are not based on actual analysis of the actors and their behavior.
Therefore, we could not say that morality was innate. If the dogs are incapable of preferring the
moral actor to the immoral actor, it is unlikely that they are capable of moral intuition. This
provides evidence for the learned morality theory, as morality must be something that humans
learn through experience and environment, and animals are incapable of it.
However, due to the clear differentiations between the moral and immoral actors that the
dogs demonstrated, it is difficult to say that the differences happened through coincidence.
Although the results contradict themselves, one can still argue that the dogs are able to discern
between the moral and immoral actors. The processes the dogs use to differentiate the two are
yet to be determined, but this may be discovered with further research. The simple fact that there
is a significant difference in the looking times provides evidence that moral intuition may be
something that is innate in domestic dogs.
Limitations

A notable limitation on the study was the small sample size. Generally, in a subtle
looking time study, the preferred sample size is between 40 and 50 participants per condition.
Given the present study only reached 27 subjects total (12 in immoral condition, 15 in moral
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condition), we cannot say that our results are generalizable, as the sample was far too small. An
increase in the number of subjects would most likely make the results more accurate and increase
external validity. In addition, a larger sample size may provide clearer results. That is to say, the
results garnered through the present study were contradictory, and a large sample size may clear
up discrepancies.
Further Directions

Due to the significant results in comparison of looking time of moral vs. immoral
condition, this subject of study is wOlih researching further. A replication of this study with a
larger sample size would likely produce more insight on the subject and more accurate,
generalizable results. A replication study could also extend the methods to include the inanimate
condition as utilized in the Ol�ginal Hamlin & Wynn (2011) study to see if any significant
differences m�se between the social and inanimate condition. The subjects could also be tested as
within subjects rather than between subjects. That is, dogs would pmiicipate in the moral
condition and the immoral condition to test for a difference in looking time, whereas in the
present study, dogs were either in the moral condition or immoral condition. With dogs
participating in both, a better conclusion could be reached to make sure individual differences in
the length of looking time did not inhibit the results. For example, dogs may be general long
lookers or short lookers. Without a dog's looking time at the opposite condition, we cannot be
sure that our results are real. A long looker may look at the immoral test for 5 seconds, and a
ShOli looker may look at the moral test for 2 seconds. By testing for both conditions, finding out
that the long looker looked at the moral test for 10 seconds and the short looker looked at the
immoral test for a few milliseconds would provide better infonnation about the dogs' general
attitudes and ensure that individual differences did not skew results. In addition to this, the study
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could be broken down by subject to see if there are differences in looking time between the sex
of dogs, the age of dogs (old versus young) or even the occupation of dogs, as a couple of
subjects in the study were therapy or working dogs.
The aim of this study was to decipher if domestic dogs were capable of having moral
intuition by measuring their looking time at a moral and immoral actor in a puppet show.
Unfortunately, the results do not provide us with a clear answer to the question. However, the
results do suggest that domestic dogs are capable of discerning between moral and immoral
actors in some way. With further research on this issue, whether it is a replication of this study or
different studies to test dogs for moral intuition, further evidence for animal morality may be
produced. Although this study did not provide a clear answer one way or the other, the evidence
of discernment creates opportunities for further research to answer these questions.
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